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The purpose of this thesis was to develop a methodology
for investigating whether it is feasible and cost effective
to transition military billets on board a typical Marine
Corps Base to civilian personnel. The methodology is broken
down into two phases. The first phase--billet
identification procedure—establishes a "Combat Essential"
criterion used for determining whether a billet is eligible
for further civilianization analysis. To be eligible a
billet must not contain any of the seven characteristics
that are associated with the "Combat Essential" criterion.
After all eligible billets are identified, in the second
phase the military cost factors along with the appropriate
civilian cost factors for each billet are identified. The
military and civilian cost factors are then compared and
recommendations for or against civilianization are made.
Phase One described above was applied to the Fleet
Assistance Program (FAP) on board Camp Pendleton, CA and
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Since the advent of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) in
1973, there has been growing doubts whether our nation will
be able to sustain an all-volunteer force of appropriate
quality and quantity [Ref. l:p. 1] . Furthermore, in recent
years, as the Pentagon's budget has been squeezed between
rising costs and alternative demands for federal funds, the
defense payroll, which now amounts to roughly half of all
defense spending, has come under close scrutiny. For the
most part, however, attention has focused on the man in
uniform, rather than on his civilian coworker in the
military establishment [Ref. l:p. vii]
.
Listed in Table I are the U. S. Marine Corps' military
and civilian manpower endstrengths for 1974, 1980 and 1988
as provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center [Ref. 2]:
TABLE I








The increase from 1980 to 1988 in both military and civilian
manpower endstrengths produced increasingly larger manpower
costs within the Marine Corps 1 budget. Thus, the issue
whether the Marine Corps can reduce its military manpower
costs through civilianization of some military billets has
been raised.
A. CIVILIAN/MILITARY SUBSTITUTION
As a result of the move to the All-Volunteer Force in
1973, the Services have taken advantage of the policy of
substituting civilians for military personnel as the cost of
military personnel has increased. Civilianization has been
viewed as an alternative solution to spiraling military
manpower costs [Ref. 3:p. 15]. Civilian employees can be
separated into two distinct groups. The first group
consisting of the following:
1) direct-hire (in-house) employees
2) indirect-hire employees
3) nonappropriated fund employees.
The second group consists of contract hire personnel who
work for private-sector firms (IBM, BOEING, etc.) under
contract to the Defense Department [Ref. 3:p. 16].
Although contract hire personnel will at times be dealt with
in this thesis, the majority of the analysis will be focused
on the civilian employees mentioned in the first group
above.
B. CIVILIAN/MILITARY SUBSTITUTION POLICY
The Department of Defense is responsible to Congress for
carrying out Public Law 93-365 regarding the labor mix
within the Department of Defense. The Law states:
It is the sense of Congress that the Department of
Defense shall use the least costly form of manpower that
is consistent with military requirements and other needs
of the Department of Defense. Therefore, in developing
the annual manpower authorization requests to congress
and in carrying out manpower policies, the Secretary of
Defense shall, in particular, consider the advantages of
converting from one form of manpower to another for the
performance of a specific job. [Ref. 4:p. 8]
In accordance with this Law, the Secretary of Defense issues
more specific guidance via the chain of command to each
service. The key assumption made in this guidance is that
civilian employees are always less costly. This assumption
has roused interest for this thesis because there is not a
defined procedure for Department of Defense use when
comparing manpower costs between military and civilian
employees. The idea of civilians being less costly is a
product of the All-Volunteer Force. In the pre-1973 era
(under conscription), military manpower was cheap.
However, since the initiation of AVF, military manpower
costs have had to be increased steadily to maintain the
appropriate manpower accession and retention levels needed
to meet all of the Department of Defense's commitments. As
a result of spiraling manpower costs, the use of civilians
in place of military personnel has sometimes become
economically attractive.
C. CIVILIANIZATION ISSUES
The primary civilianization issues to be answered are:
1) Can military billets be civilianized?
2) Is it cost effective to transition those billets
identified?
As a process of answering the above questions, the following
subsidiary issues will be also analyzed:
1) What criteria are used to identify military billets
for civilianization?
2) What issues arise as a result of vague
civilianization guidelines?
3) What guidelines are used to make billet cost
comparisons between military incumbents and civilian
substitutes?
4) Can the identified billets be classified in
accordance with the Civilian Personnel Office's
Guidelines? If so, what are the financial/payroll
costs? If not, can an indirect hire or
nonappropriated fund employee fill the billet?
5) Based on answers to questions 3 & 4 above, is a
civilian in the billet cheaper than the military
incumbent?
6) What other factors need to be analyzed?
D. METHODOLOGY
There is a need to establish a methodology (to include
billet identification, cost effectiveness, corresponding
civilian jobs, etc.) that could be used throughout the
Marine Corps for the civilianization process. Marine Corps
Base, Camp Pendleton, California, the largest United States
Marine Corps Base, will be the focus for applying the
methodology established for this thesis. Specifically, the
civilianization methodology established from the analysis of
the above mentioned questions will be applied to the Fleet
Assistance Program's (FAP's) Table of Organization (T/0) on
board Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, CA. The following
are reasons for using the FAP at Camp Pendleton within this
analysis:
1) The majority of the billets listed within the FAP T/0
are generic to most of the bases throughout the Marine
Corps
.
2) Camp Pendleton's overall physical size (the largest
Marine Corps Base) requires a FAP T/0 of 17 officers
and 596 enlisted billets.
Furthermore, after applying the methodology to the billets
within the FAP, a simulated transition will be applied to
those billets deemed eligible for civilianization. To
establish the billet transition process from military
incumbents to civilian personnel, the Civilian Personnel
Office's Classification Guidelines (including the use of
"Pdwriter", a computer software package) and the
Nonappropriated Fund Standardized Job Description Handbook
will be used. Title X, United States Code (U.S.C.)
authorized these references for billet classification of
Federal Civilian Employees.
E. FLEET ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (FAP)
The FAP is
a formulation of procedures whereby tenant Fleet Marine
Force commands agree to provide personnel on a temporary
basis to Base commands for the purpose of providing
personnel augmentation to Base organizations to
compensate for the increased workload generated by the
presence of the FMF commands while in garrison [Ref.
5: pp. 1-3] .
Billets in the FAP cover a wide range of activities, e.g v
Ranges, Food Services, Base Clubs, Motor Transportation,
Communications & Electronics, etc. Furthermore, Military-
Occupational Specialties (MOS's) in the areas of Military
Police, Public Affairs, Marine Corps Exchange, and Data
Systems are part of the FAP to achieve maximum utilization
of personnel and their individual skills which are not
normally used while serving in the FMF. Additionally, FAP
provides the necessary manpower to ensure that adequate
service support is provided to the tenant FMF commands by
the Base (Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, CA. ) [Ref.
5:pp. 1-3]. Appendix A contains the Table of Organization
for the Fleet Assistance Program at Camp Pendleton.
II. BILLET IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURE
DoD Directive 1400.5 states:
Civilian personnel will be used in positions which do
not require military incumbents for reasons of law,
training, security, discipline, rotation, or combat
readiness, and which do not require a military
background for successful performance of the duties
involved. Use of civilian employees affords abilities
not otherwise available, assumes continuity of
administration and operation, and provides a nucleus of
trained personnel necessary for expansion in any
emergency. [Ref. 4: p. 12]
Consequently, during fiscal 1974 the substitution of
civilians for military personnel, wherever possible,
resulted in 31,000 military billets being converted to
civilian status. However, in the rush to identify potential
civilian substitutes, critics of DoD policy have frequently
been more concerned with whether civilians can be used than
with whether they should be used [Ref. 6:p. 291]. Thus,
establishing valid billet identification criteria should be
only the initial step in the civilianization process. This
initial step will prevent the civilianization of necessary
military billets, and also ensure the identification of
nonessential billets, which then are candidates for further
consideration for civilianization.
A. CIVILIANIZATION GUIDELINES
An analysis of the Department of Defense's policy on
civilianization is required to establish valid billet
identification criteria. The vague guidelines provided by
DoD have given the Services wide latitude to establish their
own definitions as to the determination of billet
civilianization [Ref. l:p. 5]. As a result, the Services
use the following issues to justify their preference for
uniformed personnel:
1) military requirements—the basic nature of the billet,
its geographical location, and the mobility
requirements
.
2) personnel management constraints—the requirements
for maintaining training and rotation bases.
3) cost-effectiveness—uniformed personnel are less
subject to reductions in force and cost less than
civilian employees.
4) tradition— a commander's perception may be
justification for leaving military personnel in the
billet [Ref. 6:p. 293].
As presented in the issues above, the DoD does not use one
central criterion to determine whether a billet should
either remain with the military incumbent or be filled by a
civilian employee. Thus, establishing a billet
civilianization process using a single criterion to identify
military billets would have to either integrate or eliminate
the characteristics listed above.
B. CRITERION
It is therefore suggested that to determine whether or
not a billet should be civilianized, the following criterion
be used: "Is the billet Combat Essential?"
According to Binkin, in "Shaping the Defense Civilian
Work Force," a combat essential billet would have to contain
one or more of the following characteristics:
1) it is within a unit engaged in combat functions, and
in direct combat support functions;
2) it requires the exercise of command control,
military training and discipline, and which, by law,
must be exercised by military personnel;
3) it is within a unit that has combat mobility
requirements
;
4) it requires that military personnel must gain
experience before they can assume responsibility for
a combat function;
5) it requires certain skills and knowledge acquired
primarily through military training;
6) it requires that a civilian incumbent, to properly
discharge his/her duties, be forced to compromise
his/her legal rights and privileges, or take action
restricted by law to military personnel;
7) it is in an area or grade which is necessary for
normal career progression. [Ref. l:pp. 5-6]
Using the above characteristics would not only allow for the
integration of issues on military requirements and personnel
management constraints, but also eliminate the issues on
cost-effectiveness and tradition that the Services use to
justify their preference for uniformed personnel. These
characteristics would then establish specific guidelines for
the civilianization of military billets under the "Combat
Essential" premise. Consequently, those billets determined
to have any of the above characteristics would be identified
as Combat Essential and would not be eligible for further
civilianization analysis. Correspondingly, those billets
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that do not contain any of the above characteristics (i.e.,
have a "NO" answer to the criterion question) would then be
eligible for the next step in the civilianization analysis
process.
C. APPLICATION OF THE CRITERION TO THE FAP T/0
The above Combat Essential criterion was applied to each
FAP billet contained in Appendix A. If the billet had any
of Binkin's characteristics, a "YES" answer to the criterion
question was assigned, otherwise a "NO" answer was given.
Listed in Table II are the results of this analysis (FAP
unit, billets, manpower required, with "YES" or "NO" answer
to the criterion question, and the justification for a "YES"
answer)
.
As a result of this analysis, 276 out of the 613 FAP
billets (45%) would require military incumbents. The
remaining 337 billets would be eligible for the next step in




UNIT/BILLET (MANPOWER REQUIRED) COMBAT ESSENTIAL? JUSTIFICATION









Media Chief (1) NO
Operations Chief (1) NO
Com/Rel NCO (1) NO




Assistant Director (1) NO
SNCOIC (3) NO
Admin Chief (1) NO
Admin Clerk (1) NO
Counselor (3) NO
NCOIC (1) NO
APM/Medvac Coor (1) NO
Insp/Instructor (3) NO




UNIT/BILLET (MANPOWER REQUIRED) COMBAT ESSENTIAL? JUSTIFICATION
BASE EDUCATION
Fiscal NOOIC/Clerk (3) NO
NCOIC Counseling (1) NO






Accounting Section (1) NO
Rec Asst/Cash Coord (1) NO
Property Control (1) NO
Motor Vehicle Operator (4) NO
Auto Mechanic (3) NO
Stableman (4) NO
NCOIC/Maint Man (5) NO
Recreation Asst (4) NO
Athl Ops Chief (1) NO
Div Athl Chief (1) NO
BASE CLUBS
Mgr/Asst OFF (3) NO
Mgr/Asst SNCO (6) NO
Cook SNCO (1) NO
Asst Mgr ENL (15) NO
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TABLE II (OONT)
UNIT/BILLET (MANPOWER REQUIRED) COMBAT ESSENTIAL? JUSTIFICATION
MARINE OORPS EXCHANGE
Exchange Officer (3) NO
Exchange Operations Chief (2) NO
Exchange Man (4) NO
LEGAL ASSISTANCE
Civil Proc Liaison (2) NO
Civil Proc Clerk (1) NO
FORWARD AIR CONTROL







Communications Center Man (39) YES-
Radio Operator (1) NO
Mars Operator (2) NO
Warehouse Clerk (2) NO
Motor Vehicle Dispatcher (1) NO
Control Off Repairman (3) NO
Tele Repair Instl (3) NO
Tele Lineman (5) NO
Cable Splicer (3) NO
Sound Sys Repairer (1) NO
Fix Plant TTY Tech (2) NO
Sound Sys Installer (3) NO
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TABLE II (CONT)
UNIT/BILLET (MANPOWER REQUIRED) COMBAT ESSENTIAL? JUSTIFICATION
BASE HOUSING OFFICE
Admin Asst (1)















HFADQUARTERS BATTALION COMMAND SECTION
Food Services Spl (2) NO
PROPERTY CONTROL











Trac Trail Oper (20)














Engr Equip Oper (5) NO
Combat Engr (2) NO








Ammunition Technicians (5) YES
NCOIC Storage Unit (1) YES
Responsible/Alt N00 (6) YES
Responsible Ammo Technician (2)
Ammo Tech/Maintenance NCO (1)






Guard Officer (1) YES
Guard Chief (1) YES
SGT/CPL of the Guard (9) YES
Sentry (18) YES
Guard/Driver (6) YES-
Admin Clerk (1) NO
Police NCO (1) NO
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TABLE II (OONT)
UNIT/BILLET (MANPOWER REQUIRED) COMBAT ESSENTIAL? JUSTIFICATION
TRAINING FACILITIES OFFICE










Range Maintenance Man (22) NO
KD Range Maint/Driver (5) NO
Range Mint/Driver (2) NO
CORRECTIONS BATTALION
Admin Chief/Clerk (3) NO
Driver/Chaser (2) NO
Motor Vehicle Oper (1) NO
Food Service Spl (3) NO
Baker (1) NO
Metal Shop Supv (2) NO
Paint Shop Supv (1) NO
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TABLE II (OONT)
UNIT/BILLET (MANPOWER REQUIRED) COMBAT ESSENTIAL? JUSTIFICATION
MILITARY POLICE BATTALION
Plans/Training Officer (1) YES-

























Trng Records Clerk (1) NO
Maintenance NOD (1) NO
Warehouseman (1) NO
Vehicle Registr Clk (1) NO
Coder Clerk (2) NO
ILF NOO (1) NO
Records Supr/Clerk (4) NO
Admin Clerk (1) NO
Complaint Clerk (1) NO
21A COORD OFFICE
Food Service Spl (5) NO
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TABLE II (OONT)
UNIT/BILLET (MANPOWER REQUIRED) COMBAT ESSENTIAL? JUSTIFICATION
SCHOOLS BATTALION
Director/Deputy (2) NO
Operations Chief (1) NO
Supply Chief (1) NO
Admin Chief/Clerk (2) NO





Grounds Maint NOO (1) NO
Range Maint/Salvage (3) NO
Food Service Spl (3) NO
Baker (2) NO
Motor Vehicle Oper (25) NO
Athletic Rec Asst (1) NO
18
TABLE II (OONT)










Sergeant (1) YES required/
Training Company Gunnery necessary
Sergeant (1) YES
for career
Rifle Platoon Commander (3) YES
path
Weapons Platoon Commander (1) YES
Troop Leader (10) YES-
Barracks/Grounds Man (1) NO
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III. BILLET SUBSTITUTION COSTS
Up to now, there has been little mention in this thesis
of billet substitution costs because when considering
military/civilian substitution, the DoD directives do not
address the issue of cost. The implicit assumption made is
that civilians are cheaper. With this assumption, the
perception is that the DoD is complying with Congress and
Public Law 93-365 [Ref. 7:p. 27]. However, it is not always
true that civilians are cheaper. For example, at the start
of the AVF, the United States Air Force converted more than
14,000 military billets to civilian positions. These
conversions were made without considering if they were the
most effective and efficient decision. As a result, forty
percent (40%) of the conversions were to a more expensive
resource. It was later discovered that in certain
specialties military manpower was cheaper than its civilian
counterpart [Ref. 7:p. 29].
The next phase in determining whether a "noncombat
essential" billet (identified in Chapter II) can be
civilianized is broken down into the following steps:
1) identify the cost factors involved with military
personnel
;
2) identify the cost factors involved with civilian
employees;
3) compare the cost factors of having a military
incumbent to a civilian replacement.
20
A. MILITARY COSTS
In determining the actual cost of military personnel, it
is not enough to take budget costs and divide by the number
of personnel. The actual cost of military personnel can be
broken down into billet costs and annual compensation costs.
The difference is that compensation costs only look at the
payroll aspect (the salary needed to pay the person filling
the billet) , while billet costs take into consideration the
training pipeline, attrition, and recruiting costs that are
necessary to keep a sufficient number of personnel eligible
to fill a billet.
The items considered in this thesis for determining the
cost of military employees are:
1) Salary which includes basic pay, quarters,
subsistence, and income tax adjustments;
2) Any special or premium pay such as hazardous duty,
hostile fire, bonuses, etc.
;
3) Supplemental benefits, i.e., retirement, health
benefits, VA benefits, etc.;
4) Non-compensation personnel costs, i.e., clothing,
PCS travel, training, life insurance (SGLI) , etc.
While not all are applicable to each and every billet, the
process of determination must consider which ones do apply
[Ref. 3:p. 24].
B. CIVILIAN COSTS
In investigating direct-hire (in-house) civilian costs,
the analysis will be separated according to white-collar and
blue-collar pay. White-collar pay has steadily risen since
the start of the AVF. This can be attributed to "catch-up"
21
raises which were made to the pay comparable to the private
sector. Blue-collar workers have had an even larger
increase during the same time period due to the rules by
which Wage Grade pay rates are calculated. Pay raises for
all federal blue-collar workers are calculated to maintain
comparability with prevailing local civilian rates. The law
provides that wages paid to workers at step two (of five
possible steps in each grade) be at average private-sector
wages. Pay at step two then becomes the reference point for
calculating increases in the other steps. The problem is
that over ninety percent of defense blue-collar workers are
above the step two level. Also, the Monroney Amendment
gives the blue-collar worker another advantage. This states
that the government is required to import wage rates from
one particular geographical area to another if that latter
area does not have an established average private wage,
thereby, resulting in a generally higher wage than that
available to local wage earners. In addition, those federal
employees (blue-collar) who work night shifts are not
constrained by local norms. Finally, these blue-collar
workers have not been restrained by the recent lower pay
increases that have been imposed on white-collar and
military employees [Ref. l:p. 13].
Costs that are common to both white-collar and blue-
collar workers include:
22
1) Compensation—base pay, overtime and holiday pay,
life insurance, retirement, health benefits,
unemployment compensation, and workmen's
compensation
;
2) Pipeline—training and travel costs;
3) Indirect—Base operations and overhead costs. [Ref.
2:p. 45]
.
Additionally, although it is difficult to allocate support
costs—national scholarship and loan programs, income tax
deductions, and federal revenue sharing—to a particular
manpower position, these costs must still be recognized as
additional costs [Ref. 7:p. 35].
C. BILLET COMPARISON EXAMPLE
Now that the cost factors have been identified, military
and civilian billet costs can be compared. In order to
compare we need to ensure that occupations in the military
and civilian sectors are similar. Some jobs due to their
combat nature have no civilian counterpart. There have
been, however, attempts to analyze the "contents" of the
various military billets. For example, one of the methods
has been to use a point-count system to compare the content
of similar jobs. Each job's content was evaluated by the
problem-solving skills required and by the degree of
accountability in that job. The point counts identify
civil service grade levels whose average content is above or
below the average job content of the military billet being
evaluated [Ref. l:p. 47].
23
Once the occupational equivalencies are made, it is then
possible to make cost comparisons. Binkin, in "Shaping the
Defense Civilian Work Force," compared selected military
grades and equivalent Federal Civilian Grades for fiscal
year 1978. The analysis found the white-collar civilian to
be less expensive than officers but the blue-collar workers
to be more expensive than all military enlisted grades.
However, these results need to be interpreted with the
following facts taken into consideration:
1) the accuracy of the point method used in determining
similar job content;
2) the figures used for the study represent average
rather than marginal costs;
3) any variations in geographical locations were not
considered;
4) the fact that there are hidden costs that surface
only when a billet by billet examination is
conducted [Ref. l:p. 48].
Although the above discussion presents a method as well as
some of the problems that must be dealt with in the
civilianization process, the point count method has a major
pitfall that needs to be addressed. Specifically, it does
not compare the billet cost factors (i.e., base pay, special
pay, training and travel, etc.) between the military
incumbent and the civilian replacement. This is especially
important, because in today's era of force reductions and
budgetary constraints, it is this comparison of billet cost
factors that will be the driving force in determining
whether or not a billet is civilianized.
24
D. BILLET COST FACTOR TABLES
The billet cost factor tables that will be used for
application to the FAP T/0 are taken from the "Marine Corps
Cost Factors Manual" (MCO P7000.14J). These tables are
contained in Appendix B. As displayed in the tables, the
largest and most conspicuous military personnel cost is for
pay and allowances. There are, however, other significant
military personnel expenses. Although the kinds of
personnel costs incurred by military personnel are similar
to those incurred by civilian employees, nonpay personnel
costs are proportionally larger for the military than for
the civilian employee [Ref. 8:p. 2-5].
E. APPLICATION OF THE BILLET COST FACTORS
Before presenting the application of the billet cost
factors, it is important to mention the method applied to
derive the civilian pay grades used in the substitution
process. The civilian pay grades listed in the analysis
below were derived from interviews with the Director,
Civilian Personnel Office, Camp Pendleton, CA and Director,
Officer's Club, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.
Additionally, the Job Classification Specialist at the
Postgraduate School made available the computer software
package "Pdwriter". This software package has been
developed to assist people who write and classify position
and job descriptions. The system allows the user to choose
25
menu statements that are keyed to a particular type of work.
The key feature of the system is that as the user is
developing the position classification or job description,
the system is evaluating the proper pay level (GS, GW, etc.)
appropriate for that job. Thus, the information received
from the interviews and the results of the software package
formed the methodology for assigning the appropriate
civilian pay grades. This application compares the billet
cost of military incumbents to the prospective civilian
replacements for the Base Club System section within the FAP
T/0. The T/0 for the Base Clubs section calls for 25
enlisted Marines— 24 SNCO ' s (i.e., E-6 and above) and 1
NCO. The rank structure, number of Marines required within
each rank, MOS, average enlisted manpower cost ($) , total
cost ($) for each rank, and cumulative total cost for the 25
billets are listed below:
RANK I MOS MANPOWER COST TOTAL COST
E-8 1 9910 (ANY) $49,033 $49,033
E-7 9 ii ii $42,573 $383,157
E-6 14 it ii $36,708 $513,912




(Note: The average enlisted manpower costs were
taken from Appendix B—Table III.)
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Additionally, the training costs that the Marine Corps has
invested in these Marines must be taken into account. It
was assumed that all the Marines listed above were of the
(03) Infantry MOS except for the E-4 (COOK) . The reasons
for this assumption were that the majority of the Marines at
Camp Pendleton, Ca. are of the Infantry MOS, and because the
(03) Infantry MOS is not a specialized field (as are e.g.
the data processing or communications MOS's). Therefore,
the training costs for Infantry Marines are less than what
the training costs of Marines in any other MOS would be.
Based on this assumption, the Marine Corps has invested in
these Marines the following training costs:
TRAINING TYPE COST I TOTAL COST
BASIC RECRUIT $4,403 25 $110,075
OCC (MOS) FLD 03 $3,791 24 $90,984
OCC (MOS) FLD 33
BASIC FOOD SERVICE $3,123 1 $3,123
FOOD SERVICE NCO $6,811 1 $6,811
PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION
SCNO ADVANCED $11,059 24 $265,416
SCNO CAREER $5,796 10 $57,960
Total Cost $534,369
(Note: These training figures were obtained from
the Marine Corps Cost Factors Manual (MCO P7000.14J)
Chapter III, Section A.)
Therefore, the total cost (average enlisted manpower and
training) for having these Marines in the Base Clubs System
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Branch billets is $1 , 507 ,821 . It should be noted, however,
although the training costs were combined with the average
manpower costs, Marines still need to be trained and their
respective training costs will still be incurred.
If the Marine Corps were to substitute civilian
employees for these Marines in the above mentioned billets,
the following average civilian manpower costs would be
incurred:
PAY GRADE WAGE I TOTAL COST
GS-12 $43,613 1 $43,613
GS-9 $30,422 3 $91,266
WG-9 $28,148 8 $225,184
WG-6 $25,182 12 $302,184
WG-5 $24,144 1 $24,144
Total Cost $686,391
(Note: The average civilian manpower costs were
taken from Appendix B—Tables V and VIII.)
As shown above, the Marine Corps 1 total average enlisted
manpower cost is $973,452 for having Marines fill the
billets. On the other hand, if the Marine Corps
civilianized these billets, the total average civilian
manpower cost would be $686,391— a potential $287,061
savings in total average manpower cost for the Marine Corps.
Also, except for the E-4 billet (COOK), the above
requirements for each billet are not directly related to any
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of the specific MOS training that each Marine has received.
Consequently, the Marine Corps is getting little, if any,
return on their money invested ($534,396) for training these
Marines during the time when they serve in these FAP
billets. As a result of this application, the Marine Corps
could save $287,061 in total average manpower costs and get
a better return on its money for the $534,396 training costs
if civilians were to replace Marines in the Base Clubs
system's billets. Another point of view concerning training
costs is presented in the section below.
F. OTHER FACTORS
Throughout the process of establishing a methodology for
civilianizing Marine Corps billets, several other factors
arose that were related to or consequences of the
civilianization process. These factors were:
1) increase in overall unit manpower readiness;
2) increase in unit combat effectiveness;
3) "Marine image" mindset;
4) additional force reductions;
5) point of view on personnel costs;
6) use of contract personnel.
The first two factors above are the direct result of the
civilianization process as applied to the FAP on board Camp
Pendleton, CA. If the FAP billets identified in this
analysis were civilianized, the overall unit manpower
readiness would increase because of the 337 Marines being
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returned to their parent units. Additionally, along with
the increase in unit manpower readiness comes an increase in
the units' combat effectiveness. Because of the FAP's
unique and vitally important support function on Camp
Pendleton, CA, only the most dependable Marines are selected
for the FAP billets. However, if these billets were to be
civilianized, the skills, expertise, and leadership ability
of these Marines could be put to use within their parent
units. Thus, the Marine units gain not only additional
manpower, but also the Marines' invaluable knowledge and
experience. Plus, each time that a billet is vacated for a
FAP quota the requirement for individual billet training
(i.e., squad leader, platoon sergeant, etc.) is eliminated.
This, in turn, would stabilize the units' continuity and
enable the units to train more efficiently, which would
eventually lead to increased combat effectiveness.
The third factor— "Marine image" mindset—brings out a
negative aspect of the civilianization process. This
aspect being that the Marine Corps might not want personnel
other than Marines in certain support billets. In other
words, "Do we (the Marine Corps) really want civilians
working in Marine billets? The answer to this question
would have to come from the highest level of Headquarters,
Marine Corps. The attitude that "Marines take care of
themselves—a band of brothers" is an ever present ideal
ingrained into Marines at Boot Camp. To change to civilians
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in certain support billets necessitates a major policy
change and may cause more harm than good. The argument for
this point is that the reductions in manpower readiness and
combat effectiveness caused by the FAP is tolerable as long
as the traditions and heritage of the Marine Corps are
maintained.
The fourth factor—additional force reduction--comes as
a result of analyzing the effects the civilianization
process would have on total Marine Corps endstrength. The
argument is that if the Marine Corps can civilianize
billets, thus reducing their total number of billets, then
the Marine Corps can, also, eliminate some of their training
billets. Therefore, an additional force reduction can be
realized. This issue, although very straight-forward,
brings with it the political issues on force reduction which
are beyond the scope of this research paper.
The fifth factor deals with which point of view is taken
when analyzing the personnel costs involved in the
civilianization process. The individual Base Commander
wants military employees because he has no payroll costs for
military personnel. However, for each civilian employee
added via the substitution process, the Base Commander's
Operations and Manpower (O&M, MC) budget is increased. The
overall Marine Corps' point of view is that if it is cheaper
to civilianize, then the Marine Corps will save on military
manpower costs.
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The final issue resulting from the civilianization
process was choosing whether to use civilian in-house
personnel or contract operators (Commercial Activities) to
fill the billets. Although this analysis did not
specifically address the use of contract operators, a brief
comment about this topic is warranted. The OPNAVINST
4860.7B--COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES (CA) PROGRAM--is the
reference used when dealing with any kind of contract
operator. Cooper, in "Military Manpower and the All-
Volunteer Force" states:
Whereas the average costs for military and direct-hire
civilian personnel are within a few hundred dollars of
one another, contract hires may be several thousands
dollars less expensive than either of these sources of
labor input—even if the civilian contractor earns a 10
percent profit on the contract services. Perhaps the
greatest cost savings are those to be realized from
substituting contract hires for direct hires. The
substitution of 250,000 contract hires for 250,000
direct hires could save about $1 billion per year [Ref.
6:p. 301].
This conclusion is based on the fact that civilian
contractors can take advantage of local labor market
conditions. Thus, in areas where the cost of living and
prevailing rates are less than the national average,
civilian contractors may be able to offer services for
substantially less than it would cost to employ Federally
compensated civilian personnel [Ref. 6:p. 301].
However, Binkin identifies the following problems when
dealing with contract operators:
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1) apparent overstatement of costs;
2) unsupported assumptions made in estimating costs;
3) unreliable cost estimates obtained from
informational quotations [Ref. l:p. 63].
As indicated from the above, the use of civilian contractors
may be more cost effective than direct-hire personnel.
However, there are related problems that come when dealing
with the civilian contractor. Thus, the mixed reviews
indicate that further analysis is required on this topic.
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IV. SUMMARY/RECOMMENDATIONS & CONCLUSIONS
A. SUMMARY
The civilianization methodology, as explained in this
thesis, can be summarized in the following steps:
1) determine the T/0 to be analyzed;
2) apply the "combat essential" criterion to each
billet of interest using Binkin's characteristics
and eliminate those billets that are "combat
essential" from further analysis;
3) determine the cost factors for those Marine Corps
billets that are not "combat essential";
4) establish liaison with and gather information from
the Director, Civilian Personnel Office (at the Base
where the T/0 is manned) to identify the civilian
counterparts of the "noncombat essential" billets
determined in step (2);
5) use the Marine Corps Cost Factors Manual, the
information obtained from step (4), and any other
sources (including the software package "Pdwriter"),
associated with these billets in order to determine
the appropriate civilian cost factors;
6) analyze and compare the results of steps (3) and
(5);
7) make recommendations whether to civilianize any
billet(s) based on the results of step (6).
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the analysis presented in this thesis, the
following recommendations are made about the civilianization
of Marine Corps billets:
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1) the Marine Corps should adopt the methodology
established in this thesis as the foundation for
their formal billet evaluation process;
2) the Marine Corps should investigate the possibility
whether there are other billets, besides FAP
billets, which are not combat essential and thereby
eligible for civilianization;
3) the Marine Corps should assess the possibility of
using civilian contractors where they might be less
expensive than direct-hire personnel.
C. CONCLUSIONS
With ever present issues of "Force Reduction" and
budgetary constraints, it would be beneficial for the Marine
Corps to identify methods to reduce their overall size and
military manpower expenditures without a reduction of their
combat effectiveness. One method which has been discussed
to this end is the civilianization of some Marine Corps
billets. Although this idea is not a new one within the
Department of Defense, the lack of recent literature (latest
used is dated 1979) indicates that the issue has not been of
top priority in the 1980 's. In fact, with the increased
spending in the Department of Defense's budget in the early
to mid 80' s, there was a definite opportunity for expansion
in military manpower. However, the easy spending days
appear to be over for all the services.
By using this civilianization process, the Marine Corps
will be able to identify billets that are not combat
essential and, through cost factor comparison, also less
expensive if manned by civilian personnel. This would then
35
allow the Marine Corps to have only the most essential
manpower on their payroll, reduce the total amount spent on
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Description of Abbreviations Used as T/0 Columnar Headings













Table of Organization Number




Required T/O Military Occupational Specialty
Total officer count for the T/O line number listed
Total enlisted count for the T/P line number
Tour length compatible to billet requirement
Special Prerequisite codes as described on
following pages
Mobilization Codes to identify source of Manpower
replacements, see Figure 1-1 and 1-2 of 30 P5320-2B
for definitions.
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THE SPECIAL PREREQUISITE CATEGORY CODES WHICH APPEAR ON THE T/O UNDER
THE COLUMN HEADING "SPL PRE" ARE DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS:
SPL PREDESCRIPTION
01 REQUIRES TYPING ABILITY WITH A MINIMUM OF 15 WORDS PER MINUTE.
02 MUST BE A HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE, OR EQUIVALENT, WITH A MINIMUM CL
SCORE OF 105.
03 REQUIRES COMMERCIAL BUS LICENSE. BASE WILL ASSUME TRAINING AND
LICENSING RESPONSIBILITIES.
04 RESTRICTED MALE MARINES ONLY DUE TO LIMITED BILLETING
FAC I L I T I ES .
05 MINI MUM AGE OF 21 REQUIRED
06 BILLET TEMPORARILY SUSPENDED BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT.
07 REQUIRES COMMERCIAL 3-TON LICENSE. BASE WILL ASSUME TRAINING
AND LICENSING RESPONSIBILITIES.
08 BILLET REQUIRES AN MOS FOR WHICH, IF FAP BILLETS DID NOT EXIST,
THE PROVIDING FMF COMMAND (FOR THE MOST PART) COULD NOT
EFFECTIVELY UTILIZE THE MARINE HOLDING SUCH MOS. THIS FACTOR IS
TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, TO SOME DEGREE, IN THE DISPENSATION OF FAP
BILLET COMM I TMENTS .
09 REQUIRES T R A C T OR - T R A I L E R LICENSE
LICENSING RESPONSIBILITIES.
BASE WILL ASSUME TRAINING AND
10 REQUIRES COMMERCIAL 1-TON LICENSE. BASE WILL ASSUME TRAINING
AND LICENSING RESPONSIBILITIES.
11 COMPUTER RELATED BILLET REQUIRING CONTACT RELIEF WITH A 14-DAY
TURNOVER PER I OD .
12 ASSIGNMENTS WILL BE EFFECTED DURING OCT AND JAN TO COINCIDE WITH
FIRE AND F LOOD SEASONS .
13 SECRET CLEARANCE REQUIRED.
14 ADDITIONAL CRITERIA FOR ASSIGNMENT TO BILLETS IN MOS 5811 AND
5812 RESIDENT IN THE MILITARY POLICE BATTALION.
(1) BE MATURE, RELIABLE, TRUSTWORTHY, AND HAVE THE ABILITY TO
TACTFULLY, IMPARTIALLY, AND FIRMLY ENFORCE REGULATIONS.
(2) BE OF PROPORTIONATE WEIGHT TO HEIGHT ACCORDING TO MARINE CORPS
REGULATIONS, AND PHYSICALLY QUALIFIED IN ALL RESPECTS.
(3) BE A HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE OR POSSESS A GT SCORE OF 90 ABOVE.
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(4) BE ABLE TO PASS A BASIC S P E L L I N G / U R I T T E N COMMUNICATION EXAM.
(5) POSSESS AVERAGE CON AND PRO MARKS OF AT LEAST 4.2 AND 4.0.
(6) NO RECORD OF COURT-MARTIAL, FELONY, CIVIL CONVICTION OR ADVERSE
IN-SERVICE DRUG/ALCOHOL-RELATED INVOLVEMENT.
(7) BE ABLE TO PASS EMERGENCY OPERATOR'S LICENSING EXAM.
(8) HAVE A SAFE DRIVING RECORD, AS DETERMINED BY THE BASE PROVOST
MARSHAL'S OFFICE.
(9) HAVE A MILITARY FRAME ON EYEGLASSES IF WORN.
(10)NOM1NEES MUST BE INTERVIEWED BY A MILITARY POLICE BATTALION
REPRESENTATIVE PRIOR TO ISSUANCE OF ORDERS TO FAP.
(11)VOLUNTEER DESIRED; HOWEVER, ANY OTHERWISE QUALIFIED NOMINEE WILL
NOT BE EXCLUDED FROM ASSIGNMENT ON THAT BASIS ALONE.
15 MUST BE QUALIFIED MARKSMAN OR ABOVE WITH SERVICE RIFLE DURING
LAST QUALIFICATION FIRING.
16 REQUIRES COMMERCIAL 3-TON LICENSE WITH EXPLOSIVE CERTIFICATION.
BASE WILL ASSUME TRAINING AND LICENSING RESPONSIBILITIES.
17 MUST POSSESS A VALID STATE MOTOR VEHICLE DRIVERS LICENSE.
18 MUST HOLD AN MOS IN OCCUPATIONAL FIELD'S 03, 08, OR 18.
19 INDIVIDUALS ASSIGNED TO I N S T R U C T R / T R 00 P LEADER BILLETS MUST BE
FULLY QUALIFIED IN MOS AT PRESENT GRADE LEVEL. MUST POSSESS
PROVEN LEADERSHIP QUALITIES, POSITIVE MOTIVATION, GOOD MILITARY
APPEARANCE, AND THE ABILITY TO COMMUNICATE CLEARLY AND
EFFECTIVELY. MUST HAVE NO RECORD OF HAZING, MALTREATMENT, OR
ASSAULT CONV I CT I ONS .
20 MUST HOLD AN MOS OF 0402, 1302, OR 3502.
21 A FINAL OR INTERIM TOP SECRET SECURITY CLEARANCE REQUIRED.
22 MUST BE FORMALLY TRAINED ON TELETYPE CORPORATION MODEL 28
EQUIPMENT AND LOW-LEVEL KEYING SYSTEMS.
23 IF SUBSTITUTION GRADE AND OR MOS ARE THE SAME AS THE REQUIRED
GRADE AND MOS, SUBSTITUTION IS NOT AUTHORIZED WITHOUT PRIOR
APPROVAL OF THE BASE FAP COORDINATOR.
24 MUST POSSESS RUDIMENTARY CARPENTRY SKILLS AND OR LIMITED MASONRY
EXPERIENCE.
25 MUST EXPRESS NO AVERSION TO WORKING AROUND LARGE ANIMALS
EXPERIENCE TENDING SADDLE HORSES PREFERRED.
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26 WHENEVER POSSIBLE, ASSIGNMENT TO GUARD OR TROOP LEADER BILLETS
WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED DURING THE LATTER TWO WEEKS OF MAR, APR,
OCT, AND DEC OF EACH YEAR IN ORDER TO FACILITATE COMPLETION OF A
LOCALLY CONDUCTED TROOP LEADER COURSE PRIOR TO ASSUMING THE
BILLET ASSIGNMENT,
27 MUST HAVE A MEDICAL EXAMINERS CERTIFICATE FOR DRIVERS (NAVMC
10970) IN POSSESSION UPON REPORTING TO THE FAP.
28 RESTRICTED TO MALE MARINES ONLY IN COMPLIANCE WITH SECNAVINST
1640. 9A PARAGRAPH 3120.4 WHICH PROHIBITS THE SUPERVISION OF MALE
PRISONERS BY FEMALE SUPERVISORS WHERE NUDITY COULD ROUTINELY
OCCUR .
29 ALL PERSONNEL IN OF 5800 (TO INCLUDE OFFICERS) WILL BE ASSIGNED
TO FLIGHT LINE SECURITY VIA THE FAP AS DIRECTED BY REFERENCE (d)
(MWSS - 372 Only).
30
31
MUST POSSESS A SECONDARY MOS 8511
BILLET MUST BE FILLED BY A WOMAN MARINE
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APPENDIX B
MARINE CORPS COST FACTORS
(ADAPTED FROM MCO P7000.14J)
TABLE III
AVERAGE ENLISTED MANPOWER COST FOR FY-88
(as of Jan 1988)
INCOME DEPENDENCY
PAY PAY AND UNEMPLOYMENT AVERAGE TAX & INDEMNITY





















nnual pay and allowance rate consists of all
items in the MPMC appropriation (except retired pay
accrual, which is shown in a separate column), and
average annual PCS travel of $736.
Calculated using the DoD standard method: 51.2% of
base pay for officers and enlisted.
Unemployment comensation is paid to ex-servicemen
under a special Department of Labor program. Cost for
unemployment compensation, income tax adjustment, and
dependency and indemnity compensation are based on the
DoD report "Average Cost of Military and Civilian
Manpower (FY-80)" escalated to FY-88. Amounts are
allocated to grade based on number of separations;
hence the amounts in each grade differ.
This is the average cost per Marine manyear for
support provided by Marine Corps bases and air
stations. Only O&MMC amount;; ,iro included. The
figure was calculated by taking the total support cost
and dividing by the number of manyears.
Income tax advantage is the additional income military
personnel would have to receive in order to be left
with their current disposable income (take-homo pay)
if their allowances were taxable. Federal income tax
is computed using the standard deduction and 1987 tax
rates.
Dependency and indemnity compensation is paid by the













AVERAGE OFFICER MANPOWER COST FOR FY-8 8
(as of Jan 1988)
INCOME DEPENDENCY
PAY PAY AND UNEMPLOYMENT AVERAGE TAX & INDEMNITY
GRADE ALLOWANCE RETIREMENT COMPENSATION SUPPORT ADVANTAGE COMPENSATION TOTAL
0-10 85,413 37,677 3,684 5,254 1,380 133,408
0-9 83,713 37,677 3,684 5,258 1,259 131,591
0-8 82,863 37,497 3,684 5,256 1,173 130,473
0-7 77,443 32,601 3,684 5,254 1,070 120,052
0-6 70,058 27,773 3,684 4,353 990 106,858
0-5 60,552 22,473 3,684 3,279 879 90,867
0-4 51,364 18,696 3,684 2.442 797 76,983
0-3 44,098 • 15,580 3,684 1,667 754 65,783
0-2 35,816 12,316 3,684 1,389 704 53,909
0-1 26,886 8,849 3,684 862 682 40,963
W-4 46,665 16,597 3,684 1,670 773 69,389
W-3 38,456 13,305 3,684 1,204 730 67,379
W-2 32,844 11,244 3,684 1,166 710 49,648
W-l 28,926 9,729 3,684 1,024 682 44,045
Notes
1 The annual pay and allowance rate consists of all
items in the MPMC appropriation (except retired pay
accrual, which is shown in a separate column), and
includes average annual PCS travel of $2,209.
2. Calculated using the DoD standard method: 51.2% of
base pay for officers and enlisted.
3. Income tax advantage is the additional income military
personnel would have to receive in order to be left
with their current disposable income (take-home pay)
if their allowances were taxable.
4. Dependency and indemnity compensation is paid by the
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